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NOTES
ASSURING FEDERAL FACILITY COMPLIANCE WITH THE
RCRA AND OTHER ENVIRONMENTAL STATUTES: AN
ADMINISTRATIVE PROPOSAL
Environmental pollution poses a substantial threat to the health
of the American public. Although pollution control traditionally
has been considered a local concern, the continued industrializaton
and mechanization of society in general, and the manufacture and
use of toxic chemicals in particular, pose a threat to the environ-
ment that is national in scope. In response to this threat, the fed-
eral government enacted numerous environmental laws and cre-
ated the Environmental Protection Agency to curb further
pollution and to neutralize contaminants already affecting the
environment.
Rather than burden the EPA with full responsibility for rectify-
ing the nation's environmental problems, Congress has relied on
the states to enact legislation, to implement federal guidelines, and
to enforce environmental standards. This reliance on the states is
best characterized as a type of partnership between federal and
state governments. A strain on the viability of the partnership oc-
curs, however, when a federal facility itself pollutes excessively and
a state tries to enforce federal or potentially more stringent state
environmental law against the federal agency responsible.1
Four of the major federal environmental control statutes are: the
Clean Air Act;2 the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
(FWPCA);3 the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976
1. Federal facility compliance is essential if the goals of environmental legislation are to
be met: "Because of its size and psychological importance, the federal government as an
institution is in a position to affect the quality of. . [pollution control] management. . ..
Federal facilities can serve as models of cooperation with state authorities. . . [and] models
of proper disposal techniques." Andersen, The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of
1976: Closing the Gap, 1978 Wis. L. REv. 635, 674.
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982 & Supp. IH 1985).
3. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982 & Supp. 1I 1985).
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(RCRA) (for hazardous waste);4 and the Comprehensive Environ-
mental Resource, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CER-
CLA or Superfund) (for toxic dump sites).5 These statutes require
federal agencies to comply with state environmental standards, but
do not make clear the extent to which and means by which a state
can force a recalcitrant federal agency to comply. Whether a fed-
eral facility should be subject to all state environmental enforce-
ment actions is an issue that has caused friction between the fed-
eral and state government partners. Resolution of the issue
requires careful analysis of the federal environmental statutes and
the limiting doctrine of sovereign immunity.
This Note examines the nature and extent of the waivers of sov-
ereign immunity contained in the major environmental statutes,
paying particular attention to the pertinent case law and legislative
history of the RCRA. Although the major environmental statutes
contain broad waivers of immunity, the Supreme Court's refusal to
recognize these waivers, in conjunction with other legal doctrines
and political limitations, often precludes effective state enforce-
ment against federal polluters. Both separation of powers and
supremacy clause considerations provide additional legal barriers
to actions initiated against federal facilities. In addition, federal
budget constraints force agencies to choose between expenditures
which further their own goals and expenditures which safeguard
the environment. In order to preserve the federal and state part-
nership while addressing the pertinent legal and political limita-
tions on forcing federal facility compliance, environmental statutes
should permit states to bring enforcement actions through an EPA
administrative panel with authority to order prompt equitable and
legal relief when warranted.
The current administrative system for addressing federal facili-
ties' pollution problems is unacceptable. By the time the noncom-
plying agency exhausts its administrative remedies and Congress
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6991 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). This Note does not discuss all federal
environmental legislation containing federal responsibility provisions. See, e.g., Noise Con-
trol Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4901-4918 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). The administrative solu-
tion to the problems inherent in the current partnership approach, however, could apply to
all federal environmental legislation relying on state enforcement to ensure federal facility
compliance.
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allocates funds, irreparable harm to human health and the envi-
ronment may have occurred. Establishing an EPA-administered
trust fund and hearing panel would allow a quick response to envi-
ronmental threats within a federal structure that would balance
the importance of promoting agency missions with state interests
in preserving public health and welfare.
This Note concludes, therefore, that establishment of an EPA
arbitration panel and environmental response fund, in lieu of the
present protracted congressional budgetary allocation procedure,
would best serve the nation's interest in improving the quality of
our environment and preserving harmonious federal-state relations
in the environmental field.
FEDERAL FACILITY POLLUTION
The "federal environment" encompasses approximately one-
third of the total land area of the United States.6 In 1975, the fed-
eral government owned or operated more than 20,000 facilities
ranging in size from vast military installations to small fish hatch-
eries.7 The Department of Defense is responsible for eighty percent
of the 1,100 to 1,400 federal facility hazardous waste Superfund
sites." Although the government spent $2.4 billion between 1968
and 1975 to improve and install pollution abatement equipment,
6. Breen, Federal Supremacy and Sovereign Immunity Waivers in Federal Environmen-
tal Law, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,326, 10,326 n.1 (1985) (citing 1983 CEQ ANN.
REP. 272, 273 (1984)).
7. H.R. REP. No. 1491, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 47, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 6238, 6285 (Administrative Conference of the United States Report to the
Chairman of the House Subcomm. on Transp. and Commerce (July 21, 1975)); see also
GENERAL SERVIcES ADMINISTRATION, INVENToRY REPORT ON REAL PROPERTY OWNED BY THE
UNITED STATES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD AS OF JUNE 30, 1974, at 8 (May 30, 1975). As of
Sept. 30, 1983, GSA reported that the United States owned more than 27,000 facilities and
leased more than 70,000 facilities throughout the world excluding certain military facilities
which the Department of Defense does not report. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, SUM-
MARY REPORT OF REAL PROPERTY OWNED BY THE UNITED STATES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD AS
oF SEPTEMBER 30, 1983, at 8 (July 1984); GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, SUMMARY RE-
PORT OF REAL PROPERTY LEASED TO THE UNITED STATES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD AS OF SEP-
TEMBER 30, 1983, at 8 (July 1984); Shaw, The Procedures to Ensure Compliance by Federal
Facilities with Environmental Quality Standards, 5 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 50,211
(1975).
8. Amending and Extending the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion, and Liability Act of 1980 (Superfund): Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Envi-
ronment and Public Works, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 452-53 (1984) [hereinafter Senate
1987]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:513
the environmental performance of federal facilities, particularly of
military installations, is poor.9
Navy ships and shore activities in the United States generate 35
million pounds of hazardous solid wastes every year.1" In 1981 the
military produced 92,00011 of the 57 million metric tons of hazard-
ous waste produced in this country."2 Although this figure repre-
sents a small percentage of all wastes produced, waste generated
by federal facilities, particularly by military and nuclear facilities,
is often unusually hazardous. The Army's experience at the Rocky
Mountain Arsenal near Denver, Colorado, highlights this fact. The
Superfund Hearings] (statement of Kenneth S. Kamlet, Director, Pollution and Toxic Sub-
stances Division, National Wildlife Federation).
9. H.R. REP. No. 1491, supra note 7, at 47, 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6238, at
6285. For example, the inspector general of the Department of Defense stated:
The Department of Defense is not in full compliance with the Resource Con-
servation and Recovery Act and other environmental laws and regulations
.... Overall management of hazardous materials/hazardous waste is unsatis-
factory .... The hazardous waste disposal contracting method is inefficient,
at times ineffective, and costly. Training and education of hazardous material
handlers and commanders is inadequate.
Andersen & Spear, Pentagon's Bad Record on Toxic Waste, Wash. Post, Sept. 30, 1986, at
C13, col. 1.
10. "Navy ships and shore activities in the U.S. [in addition] generate 19 million gallons
of liquid hazardous wastes ... [and] virtually every [Navy] facility that operates industrial
processes or health-related services" generates these wastes. Shaw, supra note 7, at 50,211.
11. Note, "Beyond Judicial Scrutiny": Military Compliance with NEPA, 18 GA. L. REV.
639, 680 n.227 (1984).
12. Florini, Issues of Federalism in Hazardous Waste Control: Cooperation or Confu-
sion?, 6 HARv. ENvTL. L. REv. 307, 307 n.1 (1982) (citing U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
HAzARDOUS WASTE FACILITIES WITH INTERIM STATUS MAY BE ENDANGERING PUBLIC HEALTH
AND THE ENVIRONMENT 1, (1981)).
[T]he portion of this country's pollution problem contributed by Federal facili-
ties is significant. For example:
.... Federal agency pollution control facilities made up 2-5% of the entire
number of facilities in the U.S.
. Of the 544 major industrial and municipal facilities in significant noncompli-
ance with Water Final Effluent limits . . . 32 or 6% were Federal facilities.
Of the 328 significant air violators, 6 or nearly 2% were Federal facilities.
* Of the 523 major RCRA handlers with [the most serious] violations ... 30 or
5.7% were Federal facilities.
Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1985: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Defense of the Senate Comm. on Appropriations, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 430 (1984)
[hereinafter Senate Defense Appropriation Hearings] (statement of Josephine S. Cooper,
Assistant Administrator for External Affairs, EPA).
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arsenal was the site of the production of chemical warfare and pes-
ticide products through the 1960s. The site
now harbors corroded canisters of mustard gas, lethal phos-
phorus wastes from incendiary bombs, unexploded rockets and
mortar shells embedded in a former firing range .... Two vast
man-made lagoons, once used as dump pits for toxic chemical
and biological wastes, are the worst menaces of all ... wastes
have leached out of both ponds, infecting the area's ground
water and killing crops.13
During the six years prior to 1982, the Army spent approxi-
mately $50 million in cleanup attempts; however, experts estimate
that complete detoxification would cost $6 billion.14 Pollution from
the arsenal continues to threaten human health today.15 Although
the Rocky Mountain Arsenal is an extreme example of the poten-
tial economic and environmental costs of improper disposal of
solid wastes, little spills also carry big price tags. At Fort Lewis,
Washington, for example, an unknown person dumped several
hundred gallons of the toxic chemical PCB on federal land, result-
ing in the contamination of 1,850 tons of soil. The resultant eight-
day cleanup effort cost half a million dollars. 6
THE RATIONALE BEHIND THE PARTNERSHIP APPROACH
The partnership approach envisioned for the enforcement of fed-
eral environmental statutes utilizes the strengths inherent in each
governmental structure. The federal government provides techni-
cal expertise and uniform minimum standards. In contrast, state
governments supply enhanced responsiveness and superior knowl-
edge of local problems. As with any partnership, both parties must
exercise their respective strengths for the system to work.
13. Rockies Menace: Toxic Waste at an Arsenal, TnmE, Dec. 27, 1982, 70, 70.
14. Id.
15. "Don't go near the tap water. ... That's the state's warning to Adams County resi-
dents near Rocky Mountain Arsenal. The emergency's real. Adams County water contains
increasing levels of the poisonous chemical TCE." Rocky Mountain News, Mar. 4, 1986, at
44, col. 1.
16. Senate Superfund Hearing, supra note 8, at 407 (statement of Dr. Lawrence J. Korb,
Assistant Secretary of Defense).
19871 517
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:513
An active pollution control role for state governments is desira-
ble because local officials possess first-hand knowledge of pertinent
economic, political, and environmental conditions and public senti-
ments. States also may have resources to devote to pollution con-
trol that are unavailable at the federal level. Finally, state resi-
dents and workers directly suffer the ill effects of inadequate
pollution control and enjoy the benefits of adequate control.1"
The example of solid waste disposal illustrates the need for a
strong federal role in environmental policy. As one commentator
notes, "Given the interstate mobility of waste and the national na-
ture of many of the large waste generating industries [such as de-
fense, chemical, and petroleum] there is no question that a com-
prehensive federal regulatory program is constitutional . . . .The
need for national uniformity in many components of the hazardous
waste program is obvious." ' Aside from simplifying compliance, a
uniform national program also would eliminate the potential for
location-based competitive advantages.1" Furthermore, the availa-
bility of federal expertise and resources for state supplementation
17. See Schnapf, State Hazardous Waste Programs Under the Federal Resource Conser-
vation and Recovery Act, 12 ENvTL. L. 679, 737 (1982):
States traditionally have engaged in a wide range of planning activities to
promote economic activity and public health ....
State agencies tend to be more responsive to their citizens, act faster, and
are more flexible in fashioning pragmatic solutions to problems. The "red-
tape," rigidity, and distance of the federal government make it slow, inflexible,
and sometimes awkward in addressing problems.
18. Id. at 736-37. Additional reasons for preserving a strong federal role in enforcement of
hazardous waste and other environmental laws include the fact that states traditionally have
refrained from hazardous waste management and have relied heavily on federal funding for
the programs that they do have, the fact that the federal government possesses superior
technical and research capabilities, and the fact that the federal government is less sensitive
to political influences than many state agencies. Id. at 737.
19. A state could not set lower standards than neighboring states to attract firms inter-
ested in lower pollution control expenses. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit articulated the argument against a uniform national clean air program administered
by the EPA in Alabama v. Seeber, 502 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded,
426 U.S. 932, rev'd on remand, 538 F.2d 96 (1976) (per curiam): "Because of variations in
air quality between states and regions the emissions criteria established under state plans
may vary considerably, thus making enforcement by EPA against scattered federal facilities
administratively difficult." Id. at 1244. The court of appeals, however, went on to say, "The
new source and hazardous pollutant criteria established by EPA ... are not tied to air
quality standards and may, therefore, vary little or not at all by area, making EPA enforce-
ment against federal facilities more convenient." Id.
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justifies active federal involvement as well. Finally, a federal
backup enforcement authority is necessary.2 0
In 1973, the EPA submitted a report on hazardous waste dispo-
sal recommending that states be responsible for program imple-
mentation and that the EPA be responsible for promulgation of
minimum national standards.21 The EPA did not advocate a com-
pletely federal system because of "the difficulty in proving conclu-
sively that the hazards [of hazardous wastes] ... justify total Fed-
eral involvement, the prohibitive costs and administrative burdens
... [and a desire not to preclude state involvement] in what is
essentially a state problem. '2 2 State participation in planning and
implementing environmental programs within broad federal guide-
lines and subject to administrative review presented a balance be-
tween the parochial pollution control interests of local govern-
ments on the one hand and the national agency mission interests
of the federal government on the other.
Two perceived drawbacks to the partnership approach are the
"potential for large expenditures of Federal manpower and funds
should the states choose to sit back and 'let the Feds do it'; [and]
.. . the possibility that Federal standards will be completely unen-
forced in laggard States simply because of the lack of adequate
[state] funds .... ,,2 The disheartening effect of unabated pollu-
20. The Senate Public Works Committee, when considering the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments of 1972, commented: "The Committee ... notes that the author-
ity of the Federal Government should be used judiciously by the Administrator in those
cases deserve [sic] Federal action because of their national character, scope, or seriousness.
The Committee intends the great volume of enforcement actions be brought by the State."
S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., at 64, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws 3668, 3730.
21. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, REPORT TO CONGRESs-DIsPOsAL OF HAZARDOUS
WASTEs (1974) [hereinafter EPA REPORT].
22. Schnapf, supra note 17, at 685 (citing EPA REPORT, supra note 21, at 22). The EPA
envisioned a "partnership" approach with the following advantages:
utilizing the Federal Government's superior resources to set standards and de-
sign programs, while retaining the concept of State responsibility for what are
traditionally recognized as State problems; minimal Federal involvement once
the States'. . . programs are fully underway; uniform minimum national...
standards, with States retaining the power to set more stringent standards...
and reasonable assurance that the standards will be enforced....
Id. (citation omitted).
23. Id. at 686 (citing EPA REPORT, supra note 21, at 23). Few foresaw the potential dan-
ger of state enforcement of more stringent state standards against federal facilities.
19871
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
tion from federal facilities exacerbates these problems. For exam-
ple, a state might find policing individual private septic systems
futile when a neighboring government facility is dumping large
amounts of raw sewage. 4
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE
Background
Sovereign immunity and the supremacy clause are two major le-
gal limitations that threaten the viability of the partnership be-
tween state and federal governments. In state actions against fed-
eral facilities for failure to conform with federal environmental
laws, courts have construed narrowly the waiver of immunity pro-
visions. The narrow construction arises primarily from supremacy
clause considerations; 5 state governments cannot unilaterally
mandate federal action. Examination of relevant environmental
statutes, however, reveals that Congress did not intend the blunt
instrument of sovereign immunity to be invoked whenever states
turn to the judiciary to force federal facility compliance.26
Although supremacy considerations underlie federal preclusion
of state pollution control enforcement, the ill-defined, oft-used ju-
dicial doctrine of sovereign immunity diverts attention from more
fundamental supremacy clause concerns. In arguing for a relaxa-
tion of the canon of strict construction, Hart and Wechsler query,
"Why should not the waiver of immunity be construed, if not liber-
ally, at least sensibly-with a sympathetic assumption of an inten-
tion of Congress to introduce, in the area in question, a regime of
law infused with a spirit of equity? ' '27 Equity is served in most
24. See California v. Davidson, 3 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1157 (N.D. Cal. 1971); see also
Shaw, supra note 7, at 50,220.
25. US. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
26. Environmental statutes usually contain broad federal facility compliance provisions
indicating Congress's intent to ensure that public and private installations adhere to the
same pollution control standards. See, e.g., the Noise Control Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7418(a)
(1982); the Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6961 (1982); and the Water Pollution
Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1323 (1982).
27. P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FED-
ERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM § 3, at 1351 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter HART &
WECHSLER].
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cases by subjecting federal and private facilities to identical en-
forcement provisions. 2s
Sovereign Immunity
One commentator has stated that "[t]he increased reliance today
on administrative techniques for effective governmental operation
makes it timely to reexamine the problem of suits against officers
of the government and to propose a possible solution of the diffi-
culties which appear."2 9 Although written forty years ago, this
statement remains valid today. Sovereign immunity is a legal doc-
trine barring otherwise meritorious lawsuits against the federal
government unless the government consents to being sued. 0 Sover-
eign immunity is a wholly judge-made doctrine; nothing in the
Constitution expressly requires it.31 Prevention of undue interfer-
ence with governmental operations is the raison d'9tre of the
doctrine.32
In 1939, Justice Frankfurter propounded the view that amenity
to suit, rather than immunity, should be the assumption if a fed-
28. Given the fact that private officials need not request environmental control funds
through the often protracted budgetary process and that private polluters' functions are at
least arguably less important than federal missions, criminal liability should be imposed
only against private facility administrators or corporate officials. Fining or incarcerating fed-
eral facility administrators or officials for violations that they may be powerless to stop, at
least in the short run, is inequitable and contrary to the dictates of the supremacy clause.
29. Note, Suits Against Government Officers and the Sovereign Immunity Doctrine, 59
HARv. L. REV. 1060, 1060 (1946).
30. See, e.g., United States v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495, 500-05 (1940) ("A sovereign is exempt
from suit. . . on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against
the authority that makes the law on which the right depends."); Kawonankoa v. Polybank,
205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907) (The doctrine "undoubtedly runs counter to modem democratic
notions of the moral responsibility of the State."); Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322
U.S. 47, 59 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (Congress has, over time, successively broad-
ened the consent of the United States to be sued.); see also C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FED-
ERAL COURTS 116 (4th ed. 1983).
31. See Note, supra note 29, at 1064-65. The doctrine has been disfavored for many years.
See, e.g., Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 306 U.S. 381 (1939) (government
corporation held liable to suit). Keifer & Keifer "marks the beginning of a series of Supreme
Court expressions of misgivings about sovereign immunity generally. But the translation of
these misgivings into an intelligible policy of interpretation in actions against the United
States has been halting and irregular." HART & WECHSLER, supra note 27, at 1351.
32. See Note, supra note 29, at 1063.
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eral agency rather than the United States itself is the defendant.3
Although Justice Frankfurter may have overstated his case, rigid
adherence to a canon of strict construction is antithetical to the
current disfavor with the doctrine and congressional intent to pre-
serve environmental quality. As the Appellate Court of Illinois
said, "Sovereign immunity is of judicial origin and is a contempo-
rary, although disfavored doctrine founded on the ancient princi-
ple that 'the King can do no wrong.' " As the poor compliance
record of federal facilities evidences, the King can do, and has
done, wrong.
Courts tend to invoke the sovereign immunity doctrine after a
cursory analysis of the current context in which the defense is
raised and a quick reference to McCulloch v. Maryland.35 As long
ago as 1882, Justice Miller expressed dissatisfication with the su-
perficiality of the judiciary's sovereign immunity analysis in
United States v. Lee,s6 writing that "while the exemption of the
United States and of the several States from being subjected as
defendants to ordinary actions in the courts has . . . been repeat-
edly asserted here, the principle has never been discussed or the
reasons for it given, but it has always been treated as an estab-
lished doctrine. ' 37
Federal Supremacy
In the context of state suits against the federal government, sov-
ereign immunity for the national government is closely related to
the notion of federal supremacy, a strong policy in our federal sys-
tem. Although state and federal interests in pollution control are,
33. See Keifer & Keifer, 306 U.S. at 388-89; see also Brady v. Roosevelt S.S. Co., 317 U.S.
575, 580 (1943); United States v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495, 501 (1940); Federal Hous. Admin. v.
Burr, 309 U.S. 242, 245 (1940). See generally HART & WECHSLER, supra note 27, § 3, at
1339-57 (explaining sovereign immunity and its scope in actions to which the United States
or a federal agency is a party).
34. Lansing v. County of McLean, 45 Ill. App. 3d 91, 93, 359 N.E.2d 165, 167 (1977).
35. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819); see also HART & WECHSLER, supra note 27, at 1339
("Consider ... whether the Supreme Court in modern times has not tended actually to
enlarge the scope of sovereign immunity, out of misapprehension of its historical founda-
tions, while at the same time professing to regard it with disfavor as an anchronism which
should be narrowly confined.").
36. 106 U.S. 196 (1882).
37. Id. at 207 (citations omitted).
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or should be, complementary, the supremacy clause presumes state
and federal interests will sometimes be antagonistic. A full waiver
of sovereign immunity would, in effect, permit state administrators
to decide how to spend federal dollars by diverting funds
earmarked for weapons procurement or salary hikes to waste-site
cleanup or pollution control equipment. Local interests must be
balanced with, not override, federal concerns. A complete waiver of
federal immunity may prompt state agencies to "spend" money
that Congress has not yet appropriated. The supremacy clause dic-
tates that at some point federal interests must prevail.
Several fundamental policy considerations that underline the en-
vironmental programs instituted in the 1970s intersect with the
notion of federal supremacy.38 Foremost among these is the view
that the primary responsibility for implementing the national pol-
icy to improve environmental quality should rest with state and
local governments. Under the RCRA, Congress limited the federal
government to a regulatory role in coordinating programs to pro-
tect public health and safety, an area of traditionally local
concern.
3 9
In evaluating the applicability of state enforcement provisions to
federal facilities, a number of competing legal doctrines merit con-
sideration. The judiciary tends to invoke the doctrine of strict stat-
utory construction when state and federal laws conflict and the
federal sovereign's preeminence allegedly is undermined. Basic to
any assessment of the effect of federal legislation upon state action
within the same sphere is a determination of whether a conflict
actually exists.40 Obvious coiflict, actual or potential, between fed-
eral and state legislation leads to exclusion of state action based on
well-established principles of federalism first articulated in McCul-
38. See supra text accompanying notes 17, 21-22.
39. See Andersen, supra note 1, at 650 ("The [RCRA] program can be envisioned as a
carrot-stick approach: federal permits and enforcement are mandated, but the states have
the option of accepting the task for themselves, with financial support.").
40. See, e.g., People v. Broady, 5 N.Y.2d 500, 158 N.E.2d 817, 186 N.Y.S.2d 230, cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 8 (1959).
1987]
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loch.41 Difficulty arises in the penumbral areas of concurrent au-
thority such as the federal responsibilities section of the RCRA.42
In contrast to the tenet that clear and unambiguous expressions
of congressional intent are required to waive sovereign immunity,43
federal preemption of state legislation requires that Congress
clearly manifest the intention to exclude state action." Sovereign
immunity thus constitutes a much broader limitation on state in-
trusion into federal affairs; however, federal sovereignty no longer
requires such broad protection. The forces that precipitated the
dissolution of the Articles of Confederation and the establishment
of a strong central government created an entrenched, powerful
federal sovereign. Slippery slope arguments that subjecting federal
facilities to state enforcement will undermine our constitutional
foundation are not as compelling today as they might have been if
made in the eighteenth century.
Courts should not presume Congress's exercise of federal
supremacy. 45 The test is whether both state and federal regulations
or statutes can be enforced in a given field without impairing fed-
eral superintendance. 46 The mandate of the EPA to establish mini-
mum national standards47 undoubtedly permits additional state
regulation in achieving comprehensive environmental protection.
41. See, e.g., De Veau v. Braisted, 5 A.D.2d 603, 174 N.Y.S.2d 596 (Sup. Ct. 1958), aff'd, 5
N.Y.2d 236, 157 N.E.2d 165, 183 N.Y.S.2d 793 (1959), aff'd, 363 U.S. 144 (1960).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 6961 (1982); see infra text accompanying note 89.
43. See, e.g., Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167 (1976); Environmental Protection Agency v.
California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Board, 426 U.S. 200 (1976).
44. See, e.g., California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 733 (1949); Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patter-
son, 315 U.S. 148, 156 (1942).
45. See, e.g., Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199 (1952), overruled on other grounds, Lee v.
Florida, 392 U.S. 378 (1968).
46. See, e.g., Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963).
47. For example, the Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1316(b)(1)(B) (1982), pro-
vides: "[ T ] he Administrator shall propose and publish regulations establishing Federal stan-
dards of performance for new sources ...." The section continues:
If the Administrator finds that the procedure and the law of any State require
the application and enforcement of standards of performance to at least the
same extent as required [by the EPA] such State is authorized to apply and
enforce such standards of performance (except with respect to new sources
owned or operated by the United States).
33 U.S.C. § 1316(c) (1982) (emphasis added). Section 1316(a)(2) defines "new source" so as
to preclude application of more stringent pollution control requirements after construction
of a facility has begun.
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As a protection against state overreaching, each major federal
environmental statute containing a waiver of sovereign immunity
also contains a paramount interest exemption.48 Under these provi-
sions, the president may exempt a particular federal facility from
compliance with any federal or state environmental requirements
if deemed in the national interest.49 Although the exemption has
been used only once,50 it provides a potentially more far reaching,
yet selective, mechanism to further supremacy policies than does
the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The need for an exemption
clause also evidences an intent to provide a significant state role in
environmental regulation. The exemption provisions would be un-
necessary if the waiver provisions were intended to be limited in
scope.
Judicial Interpretations of Immunity Waivers
Hancock v. Train
Rarely has the judiciary considered the applicability of state en-
vironmental requirements to federal facilities. The United States
Supreme Court most recently addressed the issue in Hancock v.
Train,51 a case involving the applicability of state permit require-
ments to federal installations under the Clean Air Act. The Court
determined that, although federal facilities must comply with state
"requirement[s] respecting control and abatement of air pollu-
tion, '52 obtaining a permit to pollute from a state with a federally
approved implementation plan was not a "requirement" within the
48. See, e.g., Noise Control Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 4903(b) (1982), which provides in
part: "The President may exempt any single activity or facility, including noise emission
sources . . .of any department, agency, or instrumentality in the executive branch from
compliance with any such requirement if he determines it to be in the paramount interest of
the United States to do so." See also Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7418(b) (1982); RCRA, 42
U.S.C. § 6961 (1982); FWPCA, 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (1982).
49. See, e.g., Noise Control Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 4903(b) (1982).
50. President Carter exempted the refugee facility of Fort Allen, Puerto Rico, from com-
pliance with certain air, water, solid waste, and noise provisions for a one-year period. Exec.
Order No. 12,244, 45 Fed. Reg. 66,443 (1980); see also Exec. Order No. 12,327, 46 Fed. Reg.
48,893 (1981), reprinted in 22 U.S.C. § 2601 (1982) (same exemption granted by President
Reagan).
51. 426 U.S. 167 (1976).
52. Id. at 183 (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 21).
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meaning of section 118 of the Act.5 According to the Court,
neither the language of the federal responsibilities section nor its
legislative history evidenced a clear and unambiguous waiver of
immunity with respect to the permit requirement.54
Justice White, writing for the majority, began the opinion by ac-
knowledging the federal government's poor compliance record
under the voluntary scheme instituted before 1970: "'[ijnstead of
exercising leadership in controlling or eliminating air pollution'
'Federal agencies have been notoriously laggard in abating pollu-
tion.' -55 Congress enacted section 118 "both to provide leadership
to private industry and to abate violations of air pollution stan-
dards by federal facilities."56 Nevertheless, according to Justice
White, the policy considerations underlying the doctrine of sover-
eign immunity justified a narrow interpretation of section 118.
These principles are embodied in the supremacy clause and articu-
lated in McCulloch v. Maryland:5 "[T]he constitution and the
laws made in pursuance thereof are supreme; . . . they control the
constitution and laws of the respective states, and cannot be con-
trolled by them."58 One corollary to this principle is that "[i]t is of
the very essence of supremacy to remove all obstacles to its action
within its own sphere, and so to modify every power vested in
subordinate governments, as to exempt its own operations from
their own influence. '59
53. Id. at 198-99.
54. Id. at 180-81. The Court stated that
[b]ecause of the fundamental importance of the principles shielding federal in-
stallations and activities from regulation by the States, an authorization of
state regulation is found only when and to the extent there is "a clear congres-
sional mandate," "specific congressional action" that makes this authorization
of state regulation "clear and unambiguous."
Id. at 179 (footnotes omitted)).
55. Id. at 171 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1146, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1970 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5356, 5360, and S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 37 (1970)
(footnote omitted)).
56. Id. at 171.
57. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
58. 426 U.S. at 178 (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 426).
59. Id. (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 427). Three corollaries deduced from
the supremacy clause are:
1st. That a power to create implies a power to preserve. 2d. That a power to
destroy, if wielded by a different hand, is hostile to, and incompatible with
these powers to create and preserve. 3d. That where this repugnancy exists,
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The Court in Train expressed concern for the short-term effects
of enforcing state permit requirements against federal polluters:
"It is clear from the record that prohibiting operation of the air
contaminant sources for which the State seeks to require permits is
tantamount to prohibiting operation of the federal installations on
which they are located."60 The Supreme Court first expressed this
compelling argument against relaxation of the sovereign immunity
doctrine more than a century ago in United States v. Lee."' One
commentator articulated the Court's concern: "[T]he subjection of
the state and federal governments to private litigation might con-
stitute a serious interference with the performance of their func-
tions and with their control over their respective instrumentalities,
funds, and property."82 The immediate effect of strict enforcement
would have been to close numerous nuclear facilities, military ac-
tivities, hospitals, and other federal facilities with subsequent ad-
verse effects upon national defense, employment, and health care.
Ironically, Congress itself would have been shut down. 3
A companion case brought under the federal responsibilities sec-
tion of the FWPCA, Environmental Protection Agency v. Califor-
nia ex rel. State Water Resources Control Board,4 paralleled the
Train decision. A majority of the Supreme Court again held that,
although federal facilities must comply with "requirements re-
specting control and abatement of pollution," state permits do not
fall within the Court's definition of "requirement." 5 The majority
adhered to the traditional canon of strict construction in finding
that authority which is supreme must control, not yield to that over which it is
supreme.
McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 426.
60. 426 U.S. at 180 (citation omitted).
61. 106 U.S. 196, 206 (1882).
62. Note, supra note 29, at 1061 (footnote omitted).
63.
One of the great ironies of the early years of environmental law was that,
while these deliberations were taking place, the air outside in the Capitol was
often fouled by emissions from the federal government powerplant providing
the electricity to light the congressional offices. The District of Columbia, re-
quired by Congress to enforce the new Clean Air Act, found itself nearly impo-
tent in trying to clean up Congress' own pollution.
Breen, supra note 6, Editor's Summary at 10,326.
64. 426 U.S. 200 (1976).
65. Id. at 227.
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no clear and unambiguous waiver of immunity. The Court shifted
the onus of interpretation to Congress, concluding: "Should it be
the intent of Congress to have the EPA approve a state . . . pro-
gram regulating federal as well as nonfederal point sources and
suspend issuance[s] of. . . permits as to all point sources discharg-
ing [pollutants] . . ., it may legislate to make that intention mani-
fest."66 Congress enacted broad waivers of federal immunity
shortly thereafter for the Clean Air Act and the FWPCA 67
The Lower Court Decisions
Rarely have states attempted to enforce their own enforcement
provisions against federal polluters. In Kelley ex rel. People v.
United States,6' however, plaintiffs brought a citizen suit, pursu-
ant to section 505a of the FWPCA,e9 in the United States District
Court for the Western District of Michigan. The plaintiffs alleged
that Coast Guard personnel released toxic chemicals at a Coast
Guard Air Station in violation of Michigan law. The state statutes
at issue provided that the state attorney general may maintain ac-
tions for equitable and declaratory relief "for the protection of the
air, water and other natural resources and the public trust therein
from pollution, impairment or destruction. 7 0 In denying plaintiffs'
66. Id. at 227-28.
67. See 42 U.S.C. § 7418(a) (1982); see also infra text accompanying notes 110-12. The
House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee reported that
the language of [the] existing law [Clean Air Act] should have been sufficient
to insure Federal compliance .... Unfortunately, however, the U.S. Supreme
Court construed section 118 narrowly in Hancock v. Train .... The new sec-
tion.., is intended to overturn the Hancock case and to express, with suffi-
cient clarity, the committee's desire to subject Federal facilities to all Federal,
State and local requirements-procedural, substantive, or otherwise-process,
and sanctions.
HR REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 199, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 1077, 1278.
The Senate Environment and Public Works Committee reported, "The act [FWPCAJ has
been amended to indicate unequivocally that all Federal facilities and activities are subject
to all of the provisions of State and local pollution laws." S. REP. No. 370, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 67, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4326, 4392.
68. 618 F. Supp. 1103 (W.D. Mich. 1985).
69. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1982).
70. MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 691.1202(1) (West Supp. 1986). Section 6(a) of the Michi-
gan Water Resources Commission Act, MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 323.6(a) (West 1975), pro-
hibits "discharg[ing] into the waters of the state any substance which is or may become
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claim, the district court held the statutes did not "provide objec-
tive, quantifiable standards subject to uniform application. '71
In California v. Walters, 2 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit adjudicated criminal charges brought by the
Los Angeles City Attorney against a Veterans Administration hos-
pital and its administrator for the improper disposal of hazardous
medical wastes. Based on the Supreme Court's earlier decision in
Hancock v. Train,"7 the court of appeals focused its analysis on
whether section 6961 of the RCRA clearly and unambiguously
waived sovereign immunity for purposes of state criminal enforce-
ment provisions. In a per curiam decision, the court held that
criminal sanctions are not a "substantive or procedural require-
ment," but rather the means by which states enforce substantive
standards, pollution permits, and reporting duties. 74 The court of
appeals did not consider criminal sanctions to be within the ambit
of the term "injunctive relief:" "Section 6961 [of the RCRA]
plainly waives immunity to sanctions imposed to enforce injunctive
relief, but this only makes more conspicuous its failure to waive
immunity to criminal sanctions. ' '7 5
In Florida Department of Environmental Regulation v. Silvex
Corp. 7 Florida sought to hold the Navy strictly liable for removal
costs and resource damage caused when a private handler improp-
erly disposed of Navy-generated hazardous waste. In conformance
with the traditional common law approach to sovereign immunity
cases, the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Florida interpreted narrowly section 6961. After a brief review of
the legislative history behind section 6961 and the case law inter-
preting the term "requirements," Judge Block determined that the
injurious to the public health, safety or welfare ...... A violation of this provision consti-
tutes "prima facie evidence of the existence of a public nuisance." MICH. COmp. LAWS ANN.
§ 323.6(c) (West 1975).
71. Kelley, 618 F. Supp. at 1108.
72. 751 F.2d 977 (9th Cir. 1984). Both parties agreed that the suit was in essence against
the United States, thus raising sovereign immunity considerations, and requiring a clear and
unambiguous waiver of immunity by Congress. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S.
535, 538 (1980).
73. See supra text accompanying notes 51-67.
74. 751 F.2d at 978.
75. Id.
76. 606 F. Supp. 159 (M.D. Fla. 1985).
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requirements referred to in Senate Report Number 988 are "more
in the nature of regulatory guidelines and ascertainable standards
that a federal agency dealing with hazardous waste would have to
meet."' 7 The district court noted, moreover, that the Supreme
Court decisions demonstrated a "similar intent to have require-
ments defined as objective state standards of control" rather than
the full range of state enforcement mechanisms.7 8
Judge Block posited that Congress partially waived sovereign
immunity to preserve uniformity in state environmental regula-
tions: "This narrow intrusion into federal sovereign immunity has
required that courts strictly define requirements as objective and
ascertainable state regulations; e.g., state pollution standards or
limitations, compliance schedules, emission standards, and control
requirements. 7 9 Quoting a standard adopted by the United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in a Noise Control Act case,
the district court held that Florida's strict liability provision was
not a "relatively precise standard . . . capable of uniform
application." 80
As relevant Supreme Court and lower court decisions indicate,
courts analyze state enforcement of state environmental require-
ments promulgated pursuant to federal law under sovereign immu-
nity doctrine. Strict interpretation of immunity waivers prevents
effective state enforcement. Recalcitrant federal facilities are able
to circumvent congressional intent to create a federal-state part-
nership by ignoring state environmental regulations. In addition to
thwarting state environmental efforts, overbroad protection of fed-
eral supremacy through sovereign immunity doctrine leads to sepa-
ration of powers complications. For example, a single military base,
under direct control of the executive branch, should not always be
permitted to ignore congressional intent.
77. Id. at 163.
78. Id. (citing Train, 426 U.S. at 188-89 & n.2).
79. Id.
80. Id. (quoting Romero-Barcelo v. Brown, 643 F.2d 835, 855 (1st Cir. 1981)).
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Federal Environmental Law Legislative History
Overview
The legislative history of the Resource Conservation and Recov-
ery Act and other environmental statutes provides insight regard-
ing congressional efforts to balance state and federal interests in
the environmental field. The RCRA is significant in one respect
because it went beyond federal air and water pollution control laws
in effect at the time by requiring federal facility compliance with
federal, state, and local substantive and procedural requirements. 1
Federal environmental legislation generally reflects a trend toward
broadening state authority to ensure federal and private facility
compliance with the overriding legislative purpose of preserving
the quality of our environment.8 2 Today, the Clean Air Act and the
FWPCA contain broad waivers of sovereign immunity for "any
process and sanction, whether enforced in Federal, State, or Local
courts on in any other manner. ' '83 The present waiver of govern-
81. 1A F. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 4.02, at 4-109 (1985). "Given its piv-
otal role in each of the statutes, it seems likely that 'requirements' is a term of art with a
specialized meaning common to all four [RCRA, Noise Control Act, Clean Air Act, and
FWPCA] statutes." For a discussion of federal immunity from local requirements prior to
passage of the RCRA, see Breen, supra note 6, at 10,329. See also Murchison, Waivers of
Intergovernmental Immunity in Federal Environmental Statutes, 62 VA. L. REV. 1177
(1976).
Exec. Order No. 12,088, 43 Fed. Reg. 47,707 (1978) ("Federal Compliance with Pollution
Control Standards"), required executive agencies to cooperate and consult with state and
local environmental agencies. Commenting on this Executive Order, Professor Breen said:
The Executive Order, like the statutes, defines the obligation to comply with
state and local law in terms of "standards" and "requirements." Consequently,
it probably puts no new obligations on federal agencies to comply with state
nuisance law, liability allocations, directions to take response actions at federal
hazardous waste sites, taxes, fines, or other matters which are not
requirements.
Breen, supra note 6, at 10,331 (footnote omitted). Whatever the implications or interpreta-
tions of Exec. Order No. 12,088, only Congress can actually waive sovereign immunity. See
Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167, 179 (1976).
82. See Murchison, supra note 81, at 1177.
83. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7418(a)(2)(C) (1982). Section 7418(a) provides in full:
Each department, agency, and instrumentality of the executive, legislative,
and judicial branches of the Federal Government (1) having jurisdiction over
any property or facility, or (2) engaged in any activity resulting, or which may
result, in the discharge of air pollutants, and each officer, agent, or employee
thereof, shall be subject to, and comply with, all Federal, State, interstate, and
local requirements, administrative authority, and process and sanctions re-
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mental immunity in the RCRA is slightly narrower, as it is limited
to injunctive relief. 4
Aside from the perceived need for uniform application of the law
to federal and nonfederal facilities, an oft-cited rationale for sub-
jecting federal facilities to state and local environmental require-
ments is the belief that federal facilities should support state envi-
ronmental protection efforts by serving as models of proper
disposal techniques.85 Congress has recognized that "[i]n the pro-
cess of providing [this] support, a good deal of immunity from
state regulation probably has been waived."8 The extent of a
"good deal" has been a subject of ongoing controversy between
federal hazardous waste site operators and state environmental en-
forcement agencies.
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976
Congress's express purpose in enacting the Resource Conserva-
tion and Recovery Act of 1976 was to promote the protection of
human health and environment and to conserve valuable material
and energy resources.87 To effectuate this purpose, the RCRA pro-
vides for intergovernmental cooperation in the belief "that while
the collection and disposal of solid wastes should continue to be
primarily the function of State, regional, and local agencies, the
problems of waste disposal [are] . . . national in scope and in con-
specting the control and abatement of air pollution in the same manner, and to
the same extent as any nongovernmental entity. The preceding sentence shall
apply (A) to any requirement whether substantive or procedural (including any
recordkeeping or reporting requirement, any requirement respecting permits
and any other requirement whatsoever), (B) to the exercise of any Federal,
State, or local administrative authority, and (C) to any process and sanction,
whether enforced in Federal, State, or local courts or in any other manner.
This subsection shall apply notwithstanding any immunity of such agencies,
officers, agents, or employees under any law or rule of the law. No officer,
agent, or employee of the United States shall be personally liable for any civil
penalty for which he is not otherwise liable.
The federal facilities provision of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1323
(1982), is virtually identical to the Clean Air Act provision above.
84. 42 U.S.C. § 6961 (1982); see infra text accompanying note 89.
85. See Andersen, supra note 1, at 674.
86. Id. (emphasis added).
87. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 6902 (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (lists Congress's objectives
under the RCRA).
[Vol. 28:513
FEDERAL FACILITY COMPLIANCE
cern and necessitate Federal action.""8 In delineating federal com-
pliance responsibilities under the RCRA, section 6961 provides in
part:
Each department, agency, and instrumentality of the executive,
legislative, and judicial branches of the Federal Government (1)
having jurisdiction over any solid waste management facility or
disposal site, or (2) engaged in any activity resulting, or which
may result, in the disposal or management of solid waste or haz-
ardous waste shall be subject to, and comply with, all Federal,
State, interstate, and local requirements, both substantive and
procedural (including any requirement for permits or reporting
or any provisions for injunctive relief and such sanctions as may
be imposed by a court to enforce such relief), respecting control
and abatement of solid waste or hazardous waste disposal in the
same manner, and to the same extent, as any person is subject
to such requirements, including the payment of reasonable ser-
vice charges. Neither the United States, nor any agent, em-
ployee, or officer thereof, shall be immune or exempt from any
process or sanction of any State or Federal Court with respect to
the enforcement of any such injunctive relief.8 9
Congress acknowledged the sovereign immunity ramifications of
section 6961.90 Senate Report Number 988 states that "[i]n any
regulatory program involving Federal and State participation, the
allocation or division of enforcement responsibilities is difficult."9 1
In an effort to balance the state and federal roles, the Senate indi-
88. 42 U.S.C. § 6901(a)(4) (1982).
89. 42 U.S.C. § 6961 (1982).
90. Arguments that Congress actually intended to waive complete sovereign immunity in
the RCRA, or that the differences in the language of the federal facility enforcement sec-
tions of the RCRA, the FWPCA, the Clean Air Act, and the Noise Control Act are insignifi-
cant, must fall.
Congress cannot be expected to specifically address each issue of statutory con-
struction which may arise. . . .Congress is "predominantly a lawyer's body,"
...and it is appropriate for us "to assume that our elected representatives
... know the law."... As a result, if anything is to be assumed from the
congressional silence on this point, it is that Congress was aware of the rule
[for example, clear and ambiguous waiver requirement for waivers of govern-
mental immunity] and legislated with it in mind. It is not a function of [the]
Court to presume that "Congress was unaware of what it accomplished. . ....
Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 342-43 (1981) (citations omitted).
91. S. REP. No. 988, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1976).
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cated that "the authority of the Federal Government [and limited
EPA resources] should be used judiciously by the Administrator in
those cases [which] deserve Federal action because of their na-
tional character, scope, or seriousness. The Committee intends that
the great volume of enforcement actions be brought by the
State."92
The House of Representatives also expressed its awareness of
the uncertainty surrounding the applicability of state enforcement
provisions to federal facilities. The House Interstate and Foreign
Commerce Committee noted that "[t]he question . . . has gener-
ated controversy; legislative, executive and judicial action; and a
Supreme Court decision. There still remain ambiguities as to what
such [federal] responsibilities are and who should take [enforce-
ment] action."" Unfortunately, the House and Senate reconciled
their differences behind closed doors. Congress adopted the Senate
language, but no conference report or statement of managers exists
to explain whether adoption of the Senate version of the bill also
implies adoption of the Senate committee's explanatory remarks.
Attempts to discern legislative intent are particularly difficult in
this instance because the original House and Senate versions of the
RCRA, with respect to governmental immunity, were markedly
different.94
The House Approach to Sovereign Immunity under RCRA
The House bill did not include a waiver of sovereign immunity
for federal facilities; instead, the House would have subjected fed-
eral agencies to a separate, uniform national scheme of regulation
administered by the EPA. The House Committee advised against
waiving sovereign immunity. House of Representatives Report
Number 1491 endorsed the Supreme Court's interpretation of then
existing Clean Air Act and FWPCA waivers, requiring federal facil-
92. Id. This language is identical to that adopted by the Senate Public Works Committee
in the 1972 Amendments to the FWPCA. Compare id. with S. REP. No. 414, supra note 20,
at 64, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3668, 3730.
93. H.R. REP. No. 1491, supra note 7, at 45, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 6238, 6283.
94. Compare S. REP. No. 988, supra note 91, at 63 (Federal Facilities § 223) with H.R.
REP. No. 1491, supra note 7, at 66, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6238,
6304 (Federal Responsibilities § 601).
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ities to comply with local pollution standards, but not all enforce-
ment measures incorporated in state plans.9 5
The House adopted the findings and recommendations of the
Administrative Conference of the United States, which criticized
the variations in state law requirements from one locality or me-
dia-such as air, water, solid waste-to another, and supported a
uniform national EPA-run program for federal facilities. The Ad-
ministrative Conference determined that "[i]f the authority of the
States to impose their permit and other enforcement procedures
upon federal facilities is upheld, some agencies will have to comply
with a multitude of different State and local procedures."9 The
advantages of this uniform national approach are threefold: clear
standards, substantive and procedural; clear methods of enforce-
ment by the EPA and through citizen suits against the EPA for
failure to enforce standards; and relief for states from the expense
of supporting environmental enforcement, implementation, and
monitoring staffs for both private industry and federal facilities.
The Administrative Conference report concluded:
[C]ommon sense in public administration suggests that the
'front line' of enforcements be maintained by the [federal] level
of government posing the problem .... Should the Federal
government fail to effectively police its own facilities, there ex-
ists in four of these statutes a citizen suit provision which proves
a 'second line' of enforcement .... 97
95. See H.R. REP. No. 1491, supra note 7, at 48-51, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 6238, 6286-89. The report states that "many State officials would welcome the
removal from their shoulders of the burden of enforcing environmental quality standards
against Federal facilities. State and local officials repeatedly indicated ... their willingness
to transfer Federal facility enforcement problems to an effective Federal level enforcement
program. . ." Id. at 49-50, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 6238, 6288.
96. Id. at 48, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6238, 6286.
97. Id. at 50, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 6238, 6288. The effec-
tiveness of citizen suit provisions in assuring federal facility compliance with state or federal
law is dubious: "These citizen suit provisions are valuable for plugging holes that develop in
a Federal enforcement program. However, they should not be relied upon as a primary
source of surveillance and enforcement ... ." Id., reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 6238, 6288. "[S]uch suits are too quixotic and fortuitous to be relied upon as a
regular enforcement procedure." Shaw, supra note 7, at 50,216. Eleven federal environmen-
tal statutes contain provisions whereby private citizens can bring suit for violations by the
regulated public or against government authorities responsible for tardy or erroneous imple-
mentation: Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1982); FWPCA, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1982);
RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); Noise Control Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4911
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The Senate Approach to Sovereign Immunity under RCRA
The Senate approach to federal sovereign immunity, embodied
in section 6961 of the RCRA, is a narrower version of the sovereign
immunity waivers expressed in section 118 of the Clean Air Act
and section 313 of the FWPCA.9 s Apparently, the Senate Commit-
tee wanted to avoid creating a federal bureaucracy that would es-
tablish its enforcement authority and resist encroachments to that
authority. Explaining the partial waiver of federal immunity provi-
sion, Senator Baker wrote that "this legislation does not create a
major Federal program which could become so entrenched that fu-
ture changes in direction are foreclosed." ' In Baker's view, the
RCRA represented a temporary, remedial measure designed to
help stem the rising tide of solid waste until such time as pollution
control technology and administrative programs advanced to the
point where Congress could enact a comprehensive, permanent
program. 00 This view appears to have prevailed. In adopting the
Senate's version of section 6961, Congress preserved a significant,
although ill-defined, enforcement role for the states that extends to
federal as well as private waste facilities. 1 1
Superfund
The legislative history of, and the administrative and imple-
mentational difficulties with, the closely related Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
(1982); Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g)
(1982); Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1982); Deepwater Port Act of
1974, 33 U.S.C. § 1515 (1982); Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2619 (1982); Safe
Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8 (1982); Surface Mining Control and Reclamation
Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 1270 (1982); Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C.
§ 1349(a) (1982). For a comprehensive two-part treatment of citizen enforcement suits see
Miller, Private Enforcement of Federal Pollution Control Laws, Part I, 13 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,309 (1983); Miller, Private Enforcement of Federal Pollution Control
Laws, Part II, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,407 (1984).
98. See supra note 83.
99. S. REP. No. 988, supra note 91, at 31 (Individual Views of Mr. Baker).
100. Id.
101. See id. Summarizing the Committee members' position, Baker stated: "[T]he other
members of the [Senate Public Works] Committee and I share the view that solid waste
management should be primarily a State and local concern; that the Federal bureaucracy
should not be given authority to dictate or procedures to State and local officials." Id.
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1980-CERCLA or Superfund° 2-highlight the inadequacies of
the federal responsibilities provision of the RCRA. The Superfund
section entitled "Applicability to Federal Government Branches"
is similar to the RCRA section 6961 in providing that "[e]ach de-
partment, agency, or instrumentality of the executive, legislative,
and judicial branches of the Federal Government shall be subject
to, and comply with, this chapter in the same manner and to the
same extent, both procedurally and substantively, as any nongov-
ernmental entity, including liability under this section. ' 103 Con-
gress and the courts apparently differed in their reading of this
provision. Senator Stafford, chairman of the Senate Committee on
Environment and Public Works, commented:
We included these [governmental immunity waiver] provisions
in the law for several policy reasons. First, based on our experi-
ence in other environmental laws, we believed there was a dis-
tinct possibility the Federal Government would seek to treat it-
self differently from private citizens. Second, we believed there
was an inherent conflict in some cases between your obligations
102. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982).
103. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(g) (1982). Congress has recently amended CERCLA. See
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat.
1613 (1986). In the Act, Congress sought to clarify its intent, and thus improve compliance,
regarding federal facilities under Superfund. The new federal facilities compliance section
represents an effort to redress the disparate treatment accorded private and public hazard-
ous waste sites. The new section provides expressly that federal facilities shall comply with
rules, regulations, standards, and all other hazardous material requirements promulgated by
the EPA. Thus, while federal facilities must comply only with EPA pollution control criteria
under CERCLA, the statute now explicitly provides that states shall have the authority to
enforce removal and remedial actions against most federal sites. The statute now provides in
part:
State laws concerning removal and remedial action, including State laws re-
garding enforcement, shall apply to removal and remedial action at facilities
owned or operated by... the United States when such facilities are not in-
cluded on the National Priorities List.
Pub. L. No. 99-499, § 120(a), 100 Stat. 1667 (1986).
Cognizant of the potential for overzealous enforcement against federal site "owners," Con-
gress also provided that the "waiver of immunity" provision applied only to the extent
states did not seek to enforce more stringent removal or remedial action standards or re-
quirements against federal facilities. Id.
Finally, in an effort to foster better federal-state "partnership" relations, Congress added
a "State and Local Participation" provision affording state and local officials the opportu-
nity to share EPA data and to participate in remedial clean-up action planning. Id., 100
Stat. at 1670.
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and implementation of your military [or other federal] mis-
sion[s], and the obligations of a private party charged with
cleaning up in order to protect health and the environment.
Finally, we believed there should be no doubts in the minds of
those living in and around military bases [or other federal in-
stallations] that ... their health ... was being adequately
protected.""4
If Senator Stafford's views reflect accurately Congress's intent,
then this resolve became distorted at some time between enact-
ment and enforcement. Senator Stafford summed up the state of
affairs in 1983 with respect to Superfund, and arguably the RCRA,
stating that "despite these explicit provisions, the law has been im-
plemented in a way that, for practical purposes, exempts the De-
partment of Defense and other Federal facilities from the
Superfund requirement.' 10
5
The Clean Air Act and Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Several of the same policy factors that Congress considered in
enacting the RCRA also contributed to its decision to subject fed-
eral facilities to state enforcement under the Clean Air Act and the
FWPCA. In 1972, Congress added a further policy justification for
a broad immunity waiver by expressing its intent that the federal
government lead by example: "This [federal facility responsibili-
ties] section would require every Federal agency with control over
any activity or real property to provide national leadership in the
control of water pollution in such operations.' 0 6 Congressional
hearings disclosed many incidents of flagrant violations by federal
facilities of air and water pollution control requirements. The Sen-
ate Public Works Committee admonished, "The Federal Govern-
104. Senate Superfund Hearings, supra note 8, at 347.
105. Id. Stafford's remarks were prompted in part by a December 1982 EPA study re-
vealing that nine of 13 Virginia facilities evaluated are, or have the potential to be, highly
hazardous to human health and the environment. See ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
POLLUTION CONTROL COMPLIANCE BY FEDERAL FACILITIES IN VIRGINIA (1982).
106. S. REP. No. 414, supra note 20, at 67, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws 3668, 3733. The Senate Public Works Committee used this language to express sena-
torial intent underlying § 313-Federal Facilities Pollution Control-of the FWPCA).
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ment cannot expect private industry to abate pollution if the Fed-
eral Government continues to pollute."' 01
With a view toward establishing federal facilities as models for
state and private emulation, Congress augmented federal accounta-
bility to state standards: "This section requires that Federal facili-
ties meet all [pollution] control requirements as if they were pri-
vate citizens."'1 8 Congress thus continued a fifteen-year trend by
lowering further the legal shield of sovereign immunity protecting
the federal government from liability for violating the FWPCA and
the Clean Air Act. 09
Despite language in the legislative history to the contrary, courts
have interpreted narrowly the federal facility compliance of sec-
tions of the Clean Air Act and the FWPCA.1 0 In response, Con-
gress amended the Acts to ensure that implementation and en-
forcement conformed with legislative intent."" Congress expressly
waived sovereign immunity to satisfy the judiciary's traditional ca-
non of strict statutory construction in cases of governmental im-
munity waivers. Senate Report Number 370 indicated congres-
sional dissatisfaction with the Court's initial, narrow
interpretations: "Though this [broad waiver of immunity] was the
intent of the Congress in passing the 1972 Federal Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments, the Supreme Court, encouraged by Fed-
eral agencies . . . misconstrued our original intent."'12
In amending the Clean Air Act in 1977, the House of Represent-
atives stated, "Adoption of section 118 of the Act was intended to
remove all legal barriers to full Federal compliance, except as [ex-
emptions are authorized] . . . The historic defense of sovereign
107. Id., reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3668, 3733-34.
108. Id., reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 3668, 3734. Notwithstanding this
seemingly broad congressional mandate, the Supreme Court interpreted narrowly the
FWPCA waiver of governmental immunity in Environmental Protection Agency v. Califor-
nia ex rel. State Water Resources Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200 (1976). See supra text accompa-
nying notes 64-66.
109. See Breen, supra note 6, at 10,326.
110. See supra text accompanying notes 51-71.
111. Act of Dec. 27, 1977, Pub. L. 95-217, §§ 60, 61(a), 91 Stat. 1566, 1597-98 (1977)
(amending the FWPCA); Act of Aug. 7, 1977, Pub. L. 95-95, § 116, 91 Stat. 685, 711 (1977)
(amending the Clean Air Act).
112. S. REP. No. 370, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 67, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEws 4326, 4392.
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immunity was waived by Congress. Consent to be sued was pro-
vided." 113 Anticipating similar constitutional objections and waiver
misinterpretations as those arising under the FWPCA, the House
Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee reported:
[A]rguments regarding the supremacy clause no longer permit-
ted a refuge for unwilling or tardy Federal agencies. Section 118
of the 1970 Clean Air Act Amendments . . . established, as a
matter of Federal law, the duty of Federal facilities to abide by
all State and local emission control requirements (including, of
necessity, those procedural requirements and sanctions inciden-
tal to implementation and enforcement of the substantive
requirements).114
After this unequivocal waiver, the federal enclave theory 1 5 of
exclusion for federal facilities from states' jurisdiction has not been
available to agencies attempting to avoid compliance with state
standards. Supremacy clause arguments fail as well because Con-
gress expressly subjected federal installations to state control re-
quirements and enforcement mechanisms under the Clean Air Act.
THREATS TO THE PARTNERSHIP APPROACH
Once the obstacle of sovereign immunity is overcome, a number
of potential threats to the viability of the environmental partner-
ship still remain. Although each environmental statute contains
laudable policy goals when considered separately, application of
each may cause conflict. Further problems involve identification of
the proper parties to include in enforcement proceedings-the
source of federal reluctance to conform with state environmental
regulations may be Congress itself; federal courts will be more than
reluctant to mandate budgetary items. In addition, federal self-po-
licing to augment state enforcement is problematic. Facility mis-
sions antithetical to pollution control, in many instances, prevent
113. H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 198, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 1077, 1276.
114. Id. at 198, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1077, 1277.
115. Regarding the jurisdictional problems of federal enclaves, see generally Note, Fed-
eral Areas: The Confusion of a Jurisdictional-Geographical Dichotomy, 101 U. PA. L. Rav.
124 (1952); Note, Land Under Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction: An Island Within a State,
58 YALE L.J. 1402 (1949).
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all but grudging voluntary compliance; nevertheless, the Justice
Department espouses a policy against interagency enforcement
proceedings.
Statutory Interdependence
The interdependence of the environmental statutes is a funda-
mental consideration in evaluating the application of environmen-
tal statutes to federal facilities. Ideally, proper disposal of solid
waste under the RCRA need not be accomplished at the expense of
air and water quality. Given existing disposal technology, however,
"environmental trade-offs" may be unavoidable. For example, in-
stallation of smokestack scrubbers required under the Clean Air
Act creates vast quantities of hazardous sludge that industries
must dispose of properly under the RCRA.116 Failure to comply
with the RCRA in disposing of this sludge would defeat the pur-
poses of both statutes: "A policy for air pollution only, a policy for
water pollution only, a policy for solid waste disposal only, will not
suffice. A broad policy and a coordinated effort are imperative" to
fulfill Congress's vision of a comprehensive environmental pro-
gram.117 Holding federal facilities, like private facilities, accounta-
ble to both state and federal enforcement provisions fosters proper
disposal of wastes. This view is incorporated in the Clean Air
Act"' and the FWPCA11 9 and is arguably more compelling in the
hazardous waste area because of the potentially lethal, irreversible
effects of improper waste disposal.120
States, and more particularly, individuals living in close proxim-
ity to federal installations posing serious health threats, have a
strong interest in obtaining relief from unabated pollution of their
locality. At the same time, a complete waiver of sovereign immu-
nity, even if constitutional, could result in great judicial disecon-
omy and unjustified impairment of agency objectives. As one com-
116. 42 U.S.C. § 6901 (1982).
117. S. REP. No. 414, supra note 20, at 3, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmiN.
NEws 3668, 3670.
118. See 42 U.S.C. § 7418 (1982).
119. See 33 U.S.C. § 1323 (1982).
120. See H.R REP. No. 1491, supra note 7, at 17-24, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN NEws 6238, 6254-62.
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mentator points out, any solution to this problem must take into
account
[t]he danger of suspending a vital governmental function by an
erroneous decree of a lower court. . .[which may] be mitigated
by sound judicial administration in refusing to grant relief pend-
ing appeals in those cases in which the governmental interest in
uninterrupted activity outweighs the private interest which the
plaintiff is seeking to protect." 1
The Budgetary Process
Many disputes arise when a federal agency or facility adminis-
trator agrees that a certain environmental protection measure is
appropriate, but compliance with state substantive requirements is
not possible in the short run due to budgetary constraints or pri-
orities. Federal agencies may in fact be more willing to invest in
environmental protection than private industry because doing so
will not put the agency at a competitive disadvantage or reduce
dividends to shareholders. No other domestic firms compete with
the Department of the Navy for the nation's maritime defense. By
contrast, private businesses are understandably averse to investing
in pollution control because increased expenditures mean less
profit.
Even from the perspective of the federal government, waste
cleanups and pollution control are expensive. 22 Federal installa-
tions request funds from the federal budget for various activities.
A Defense Department agency consolidates typical operating activ-
ities into an "operations and maintenance" fund request which, be-
cause of its size, may be broken down as separate line-items in the
departmental budget. 2 ' If, for example, the Navy wants $25 mil-
lion to install pollution control equipment required at a Norfolk
121. Note, supra note 29, at 1062.
122. See supra notes 14 and 16 and accompanying text; see also Note, The Bankruptcy
Code and Hazardous Waste Cleanup: An Examination of the Policy Conflict, 27 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 165, 165 n.1 (1985).
123. See A. SCHICK, CONGRESS AND MONEY BUDGETING, SPENDING AND TAXING 271-77
(1980). The Senate Budget Committee "officially eschews line-item decisions, insisting that
the only numbers with legal effect are the budget aggregates and the amounts allocated to
each function." Id. at 271. "[M]embers can afford to avoid line-item debate [however] only
when they are sure that their programs will not be prejudiced thereby. When failing to
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facility, the installation's request for this money may be scruti-
nized separately in committee. 124 In the course of Congress's delib-
erations over the requested DOD appropriation, this line-item may
be reduced in order to "trim the fat" from the defense budget, to
allocate funds to higher priority items, or in the belief that $18
million, say, will do the job. As a result, the facility does not have
sufficient funds to effect adequate pollution control measures. The
importance of the budgetary process lies in the fact that Congress
may decide to limit environmental compliance appropriations,
even when the agency responsible for a particular facility makes
the fund request as a good faith response to state environmental
regulators.
To continue the illustration, suppose Virginia wants to cite the
Norfolk facility for a violation of the RCRA. Should the state pe-
nalize the facility administrator or the members of Congress re-
sponsible for cutting requested pollution control appropriations?
Congress would surely raise a separation of powers or political
question defense to any federal court injunction (or a federal
supremacy defense to a state court injunction) ordering appropria-
tion of funds sufficient to effectuate "adequate" pollution control
measures.
At present, injunctive relief under the major environmental stat-
utes remains a matter of equitable discretion for the court; thus, a
judge may order federal facility compliance without ordering a ces-
sation of operations in the interim.125 To prevent the type of con-
frontation inherent in ordering cessation of operations, a federal
court will likely order such a limited injunction; however, the im-
itemize programs offers inadequate protection . . .the decision breaks out into line-item
debate." Id. at 274.
124. For a lucid discussion of the politics of line-itemization in the budgetary process, see
id. at 271-77. Schick writes:
[Ilt would be truly startling if [Senate Budget Committee] members were in-
terested only in the totals and not the parts . . . .They would be allocating
billions of dollars without caring about which program got what, without trying
to assist the programs they believed in or the constituencies they served ....
The opportunities for logrolling would be greatly circumscribed, as would the
possibility of buying budgetary agreement by offering line-item inducements to
reluctant committee members.
Id. at 273.
125. See Breen, supra note 6, at 10,330.
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petus to take corrective measures is thereby reduced. In consider-
ing the FWPCA, the Senate Environment and Public Works Com-
mittee noted that "if the timetables established throughout the
Act are to be met, the threat of sanction must be real, and enforce-
ment provisions must be swift and direct. ' 126 Whether state en-
forcement measures taken against federal facilities are constitu-
tional, in light of Congress's mandate to provide for the national
interests, is an issue requiring consideration of both constitutional
and economic issues.
Facility Mission versus Environmental Responsibility
Congressional expectations of federal facility leadership in the
environmental field remain unfulfilled. Neither state agencies nor
the EPA have the manpower to keep tabs on the environmental
performance of federal facilities to the extent desirable. Ideally, fa-
cility administrators themselves would inform officials of pollution
control violations or would request pollution control equipment
when necessary. Not surprisingly, this has not been the case. A
leading regulatory policy implementation theory provides one pos-
sible explanation for federal recalcitrance as opposed to leader-
ship: "The more a target agency's mission is [perceived to be] in-
consistent with, alien to, or hostile toward an environmental
policy, the greater the amount of behavioral change required, and
consequently the more likely implementation difficulty.' 127
126. S. REP. No. 414, supra note 20, at 65, reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
3668, 3731. Each of the statutes waives sovereign immunity, to greater and lesser degrees.
The most extensive waiver being "to the same extent as any private person." State attempts
to penalize federal facilities more harshly than private facilities responsible for comparable
violations, therefore, would be struck down. The Comptroller General noted that if "feder-
ally owned facilities are treated in the same manner as non-federally owned facilities" then
federal facilities can be liable for state-imposed fines. See Breen, supra note 6, at 10,330.
127. Durant, EPA, TVA and Pollution Control: Implications for a Theory of Regulatory
Policy Implementation, 44 PUB. ADMIN. REv. 305, 311 (1984).
[I]mplementation difficulties can be more accurately anticipated if the interac-
tion patterns of those factors comprising the "noncompliance delay effect" are
known: (1) the degree to which the application of a policy directly affects activ-
ities central to a regulatory target's mission, and (2) the extent to which the
time delay inherent in challenging implementation is perceived by the target as
adversely affecting the realization of that mission.
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To continue with the Norfolk example, the Navy would not view
the facility's military and environmental responsibilities as incom-
patible in the abstract. When formulating budget requests, the De-
partment of the Navy would include desired new pollution control
systems along with desired new weapons systems. In reality, how-
ever, the Navy knows it will not receive unlimited economic sup-
port. As Professor Shaw notes:
Regrettably, many facility operators and, in turn, their agency
supervisors, have been cynical and suspicious. They have feared
that the funds for the proposed [environmental protection]
projects would be taken from elsewhere in their operating budg-
ets and have recognized that related increases in operating and
manpower budgets necessitated by the new [pollution control]
equipment would not be given special consideration .... Con-
sequently, some [agencies] have chosen not to initiate plans and
budget requests, thereby aborting the whole strategy.128
Given their conflicting constituencies, facility and agency adminis-
trators "must weigh protection of the environment against produc-
tion goals, personnel problems, budget restraints and other pres-
sures or agency missions."'2 9
The current internal system for ensuring federal facility compli-
ance, therefore, is inadequate.130 The long budgetary cycle of fed-
eral agencies accounts in part for the poor federal compliance rec-
ord. A private facility may, at the "request" of enforcement
authorities, be able to order, to purchase, and to install required
pollution control equipment in a matter of months, securing fund-
ing through reduced dividends to shareholders, increased prices to
consumers, or cuts in operating expenses. Federal agencies, in con-
trast, must submit funding requests to Congress. In light of budg-
etary constraints and the relatively low position of pollution con-
128. Shaw, supra note 7, at 50,213.
129. Id.
130. In light of responses such as this state official's, the efficacy of the "partnership" is
questionable:Q: How does your state office deal with the environmental problems caused by
federal facilities?
A: We throw up our hands.
Id. at 50,222 (quoting conversation with the Compliance Counsel for the New York State
Department of Environmental Conservation).
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trol on the domestic political agenda, adequate funding may take
years as opposed to months. As a result, fulfillment of state pollu-
tion control timetables is impeded and public health is affected
adversely.
Yet another problem exists in that, although obtaining start-up
funds for a pollution control project may be fairly difficult, main-
taining adequate funding is often even more difficult. As Durant
says, "While legislation is the product of conditions and coalitions
at a single point in time, implementation must occur over time.
Consequently, [federal programs-for pollution control, for exam-
ple-are] vulnerable to shifting concerns, policy attitudes, and po-
litical agendas that can render implementation both unpopular
and problematic. ' 131 Any viable federal facility compliance pro-
gram must attempt to insulate pollution control programs from
such political influences.
Department of Justice Policy
Another reason agencies are reluctant to comply voluntarily with
the enforcement of Superfund and other environmental statutes is
the longstanding policy of the Department of Justice against suing
sister agencies. In its debates on Superfund, the Senate stated,
"Clearly, a polluting facility has little incentive to rectify deficien-
cies or to negotiate seriously when it knows that the responsible
regulatory authorities have rendered themselves powerless to com-
pel compliance by recourse to judicial enforcement action.' 1 32 In
fact, the Attorney General informed the EPA that he did not want
to involve the judicial branch in resolving executive branch
problems and that, if the EPA attempted to initiate legal actions
on its own against federal polluters, the Justice Department would
intervene against the EPA.13 3 The Justice Department espouses
131. Durant, supra note 127, at 312; see also Sabatier, Social Movements & Regulatory
Agencies, 6 POL'Y Sci. 301-42 (1975); Van Meter & Van Horn, The Policy Implementation
Process: A Conceptual Framework, 6 ADMIN. & Soc'Y. 445, 445-48 (1975).
132. Senate Superfund Hearing, supra note 8, at 460 ("DOD's sometimes cavalier atti-
tude is perhaps not surprising in view of the facts that DOD does not regard environmental
protection as a primary mission, and that EPA and the Department of Justice ... have a
longstanding blanket policy against ever taking court action against non-complying federal
facilities.").
133. Id.
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the view that "'suing an agency of the United States' is not among
the 'enforcement tools. . . necessary or appropriate for one unit of
government to use against another' in the implementation of CER-
CLA [Superfund] or any other federal law. '134 Moreover, the Jus-
tice Department has taken the position that suit of one federal
agency by another violates article III justiciability requirements. 135
If the EPA will not go after federal polluters and states cannot,
then the federal facility compliance sections of the environmental
statutes are emasculated.
PROPOSAL: EPA-ADMINISTERED PANEL AND TRUST FUND
Reconciliation of state and federal interests in the environmen-
tal law area is difficult. "[G]rave interference with the performance
of a governmental function"1 6 may result from a broad waiver of
sovereign immunity. Erring on the side of local interests threatens
values embodied in the supremacy clause. On the other hand, Sen-
ator James Buckley articulated the drawbacks of allowing federal
interests to predominate:
[D]espite the pious references to the primacy of the state role
... [federal predominance] may well threaten . . .to reduce
the role of the states and local governments to that of "errand
boy," so that the bill may, in fact, encourage states to withdraw
from the national effort.1 37
An equitable balance between local and national interests is re-
quired to preserve constitutional values and promote Congress's
purpose in enacting environmental statutes.
134. Id. at 460-61 (quoting letter from Robert A. McConnell, Assistant Attorney General,
Office of Legislative Affairs, DOJ, to Representative John Dingell, Chairman, Subcommittee
on Oversight and Investigations, House Energy and Commerce Committee (Oct. 11, 1983)
(maintaining that federal agencies are willing to voluntarily pay their fair share of clean-up
costs)).
135. Id. at 461. Kenneth Kamlet, of the National Wildlife Federation, counters this asser-
tion by pointing out that "[g]iven the fact that various Federal Agencies have often been on
different sides of the same litigation, one would have to exalt the fiction of a monolithic
Executive Branch over the realities of everyday life for such an argument to prevail." Id. at
452.
136. Federal Hous. Admin. v. Burr, 309 U.S. 242, 245 (1940).
137. S. REP. No. 414, supra note 20, at 102, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWs 3668, 3763. Senator Buckley continued, "The active participation by state and local
governments... and a mood of cooperation and interdependence between those units of
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Undoubtedly, cases will arise in which, for reasons of national
defense or fulfillment of other important federal facility objectives,
compliance with state provisions would be inappropriate. Policies
embodied in the supremacy clause must prevail. The presidential
exemption provision is one means of ensuring that environmental
policies do not predominate over more important national con-
cerns. Obtaining an exemption takes time, however, and histori-
cally exemptions are offered infrequently. 138
An alternative to a complete waiver of sovereign immunity-and
the resultant court battle whenever federal agency and state envi-
ronmental interests collide-is to take an administrative action or
proceeding to the EPA. With its environmental expertise, the EPA
could act as arbitrator; its determination would be binding and
federal in nature, thereby assuaging sovereign immunity and fed-
eral supremacy concerns. Suit in state court-subject to removal to
federal court-would be available if either the state or agency felt
the EPA had not vindicated its rights.
Congress could establish a federal environmental board with au-
thority to order diversion of agency or facility funds to pollution
control purposes when deemed in the public interest. It could cre-
ate a federal environmental response fund, along the lines of
Superfund, but with a narrower purpose, funding compliance by
federal facilities with environmental statutory programs. Federal
agencies would contribute a pro-rata portion of their funds based
on current and projected pollution control funding requirements.
The federal government, in addition to paying for actual cleanup
expenses, is not prepared to spend the millions of dollars that
states might levy as punitive provisions and fines under a full
waiver of sovereign immunity. Harsh fines on private corporations
alienate or bankrupt businesses, thus eliminating jobs and reduc-
ing tax revenues. Because federal facilities are not entities operat-
ing for profit and, therefore, not likely to react to fines by reducing
business or leaving the state, states would not be subject to the
government and EPA, are essential to the success of the [environmental] program. The fed-
eral government cannot possibly ... administer this program without the active coopera-
tion of the states." Id. at 3767.
138. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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same set of negative incentives inherent in prosecuting private
entities.139
The trust fund approach mitigates the potential for dispropor-
tionate state enforcement against federal polluters because states
would, in effect, serve as enforcement agents of the EPA. Fines
assessed by state or federal courts would go to the EPA-adminis-
tered trust fund for redistribution to federal facility control pro-
grams. Despite the fact that federal agencies retain control of the
funds under this proposal, incentives for environmental responsi-
bility are present in that agencies do not want to see their appro-
priated funds go back into a cleanup trust fund. Although state
coffers are not enriched, state residents still benefit from improved
pollution control.
Through the development of an environmental trust fund, agen-
cies could circumvent the laborious congressional budgetary pro-
cess and obtain relatively quick access to funds when the public
health and welfare is at risk. Congress can address the problem
posed by federal facility noncompliance by agreeing upon a mecha-
nism for triggering an immediate allocation from the environmen-
tal response fund: a state court injunction, a federal court damage
award, or an EPA panel decision, for example. Once implemented,
the mechanism would prevent federal agencies from invoking the
doctrine of sovereign immunity or claiming insufficient funds when
called upon by a federal panel to right environmental wrongs.
This Note proposes establishment of both a new trust
fund-distinct from Superfund-and an administrative panel to
expedite federal cleanups. The same results could not be achieved
through the existing Superfund mechanism because use of
"Superfunds" is not permitted for cleanups when the site owner is
known and solvent;140 moreover, CERCLA prohibits expenditures
139. But see California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Bd. v. Environmental Pro-
tection Agency, 511 F.2d 963, 968-69 (9th Cir. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 426 U.S. 200,
207 (1976) ("[T~he [FWPCA] in no way seeks to limit Congress' ability to reassert exclusive
control over the affected federal areas. Nor does it seem that in practice Congress would be
politically compelled to retain the Act in its present form, if states attempted significant
incursions into the federal prerogative.").
140. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 9611 (1982).
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from Superfund for long-term cleanups at federal sites.14' The
EPA's Assistant Administrator for External Affairs, Josephine
Cooper, pointed out that "where there are imminent substantial
endangerment situation[s]-where the public is at risk in an emer-
gency type situation-the Superfund money can be used. . . when
there is really a situation that warrants it."'1 42 The tone of Ms.
Cooper's remarks highlights the EPA's unwillingness to use
Superfund for federal facility cleanup. This reluctance is under-
standable, considering that Superfund was designed to clean up
preexisting pollution problems in the vast number of private facili-
ties and sites.
The goals envisioned for the separate trust fund and the federal
facility pollution panel are ambitious: to prevent future problems,
to expeditiously correct past abuses and, perhaps most impor-
tantly, to provide the environmental leadership model envisioned
by Congress. Nevertheless, meeting those goals is necessary to ef-
fectuate the policies underlying federal environmental legislation.
Avoiding the unwieldy, time-consuming Superfund"4 ' or budgetary
allocation request process14 4 through a streamlined EPA trust fund
and panel would promote rapid federal compliance, preserve the
"federal environment," and provide a public model for private
emulation.1 45
141. See Senate Defense Appropriation Hearings, supra note 12, at 435 (statement of
Josephine S. Cooper, Assistant Administrator for External Affairs, EPA).
142. Id. at 440 (emphasis added).
143. "For federal facilities, an administrative approach grounded in cooperative action is
used rather than the enforcement/litigation approach grounded in compelled action used for
non-federal facilities." EPA FEDERAL FACILITIES COMPLIANCE PROGRAM, STRATEGY FOR RESO-
LUTION OF COMPLIANCE PROBLEMS AT FEDERAL FACILITIES 6 (1984). For a discussion of the
administrative process for assuring federal facility compliance, see id. at 12-15.
144. For a brief discussion of the budgetary process see supra text accompanying notes
122-24.
145. See supra text accompanying notes 106-09. Although referring to Superfund appro-
priations, Senator Stevens highlighted the merits of a separate federal facility trust fund as
well: "We didn't want the DOD to have to wait for Superfund money. We believed they
should have the money up front and proceed to spend the money and maintain what I think
is the best image of the DOD and aggressive pursuit in accord with Federal law." Senate
Defense Appropriation Hearings, supra note 12, at 440. Stevens sought to combat the nega-
tive perception of federal facility pollution control held by the public, the media, and many
of the members of Congress:
[P]rogress of Federal installations is too little and too slow. Many also believe
that Federal officials are not sufficiently sensitive to the pollution generated by
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CONCLUSION
The present statutory framework for federal environmental pro-
tection, as implemented, does not protect adequately the health of
the American public. Agencies often need several years advance
notice to factor environmental costs into budget requests and, in
turn, to receive funding to comply with state requests. Herein lies
the crux of the problem. State enforcement timetables, and quite
possibly health concerns, do not allow for this lag between agency
requests, congressional outlays, and facility implementation. Given
the inertia of the budgetary process, the decentralization efforts of
the Reagan administration,14e agency perceptions of facility mis-
sion incompatibility with environmental responsibility, and the
current fiscal conservatism, spurring rapid federal agency environ-
mental response presents an elusive problem.
A complete waiver of sovereign immunity might create more
problems than it would solve and would- provoke serious constitu-
tional objections. In light of the fact that federal facilities are not
operating for profit, resistance to environmental compliance should
be minimal provided that funds are available. The problem lies in
the unique functions performed by the federal government in our
society; the Navy, for instance, cannot sell off an air station or re-
duce its defense dividend to the citizenry to meet environmental
obligations. At present, agencies must go through traditional con-
gressional budgetary channels to obtain pollution control
financing.
Rather than blustering that "The King can do no wrong" when
states demand compliance with environmental law, a federal facil-
their current or past operations or the impact this pollution may have on the
people using or living just outside the boundaries of these facilities.
Id. at 424.
146. Post-1981 funding patterns reflect the Reagan administration's emphasis on political
decentralization and lowering regulatory compliance costs for industry. See C. Davis, Imple-
menting the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976: Problems and Prospects, 9
PUB. ADMIN. Q. 218, 255 (1985).
The statutory language and the Reagan administration's policy may well result in mixed
signals to facility administrators which undermine Congress's intent in enacting waivers of
sovereign immunity and comprehensive environmental legislation. As a result, "[tihe exer-
cise of discretionary authority becomes a more plausible option for the. . . administrator
[because] policy standards are characterized by ambiguity or bureaucratic conflict at higher
levels as well as continuing political support for program decentralization." Id. at 232.
1987]
552 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:513
ity administrator's response is more likely to be, "We don't have
the funds." Meanwhile, public exposure to harmful pollutants con-
tinues unabated. If the nation is to fulfill the goals enunciated in
the RCRA, the FWPCA, the Clean Air Act, and the Noise Control
Act, Congress must relinquish some control over the purse strings
so that federal agencies, through the EPA administrative panel
and trust fund, can expedite allocation of funds needed to fulfill
federal facility environmental obligations.
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